Publications

MEGA: Malleable Encryption Goes Awry

Published in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2023

We show that the cryptographic design of the cloud storage system MEGA does not protect its users against a malicious server and present five distinct attacks, which together allow for a full compromise of the confidentiality of user files.

Recommended citation: Matilda Backendal, Miro Haller and Kenneth G. Paterson. (2023). "MEGA: Malleable Encryption Goes Awry" 44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/959

HECO: Automatic Code Optimizations for Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Published in arXiv preprint, 2022

HECO is an end-to-end compiler for FHE that aims to enable non-experts to develop secure and efficient FHE applications.

Recommended citation: Alexander Viand, Patrick Jattke, Miro Haller, Anwar Hithnawi. (2022). "HECO: Automatic Code Optimizations for Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption" arXiv preprint, arXiv:2202.01649. https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01649

Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend

Published in USENIX Security, 2021

We introduce a timing side-channel attack in the Frontend of Intel CPU processors, which uncovers measurable differences between instructions that only differ in their adjacent instructions and virtual addresses.

Recommended citation: Ivan Puddu, Moritz Schneider, Miro Haller, Srdjan Čapkun. (2021). "Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend" USENIX Security 2021. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-puddu.pdf

Miro Haller

Publications

MEGA: Malleable Encryption Goes Awry

HECO: Automatic Code Optimizations for Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-​Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend

Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend