End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage
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Recommended citation: M. Backendal, M. Haller, K. G. Paterson, "End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage" IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10488835
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Recommended citation: M. Backendal, M. Haller, K. G. Paterson, "End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage" IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10488835
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Recommended citation: Ivan Puddu*, Moritz Schneider, Miro Haller, Srdjan Čapkun. (2021). "Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend". USENIX Security 2021. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-puddu.pdf
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Recommended citation: Matilda Backendal, Miro Haller* and Kenneth G. Paterson. (2023). "MEGA: Malleable Encryption Goes Awry". IEEE S&P 2023.
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Recommended citation: Martin R. Albrecht, Miro Haller, Lenka Mareková*, Kenneth G. Paterson. (2023). "Caveat Implementor! Key Recovery Attacks on MEGA". Eurocrypt 2023. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_7
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Recommended citation: Alexander Viand*, Patrick Jattke, Miro Haller, Anwar Hithnawi. (2023). "HECO: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Compiler". USENIX Security 2023. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/viand
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Recommended citation: Alex Bellon, Miro Haller*, Andrey Labunets, Enze Liu, and Stefan Savage. (2025). "An Empirical Analysis on the Use and Reporting of National Security Letters". CSLAW 2025 https://computersciencelaw.org/2022/accepted-papers/
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Recommended citation: Sharon Goldberg, Miro Haller*, Nadia Heninger*, Mike Milano, Dan Shumow, Marc Stevens, Adam Suhl*. (2024). "RADIUS/UDP considered harmful". USENIX Security 2024 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-goldberg.pdf
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Recommended citation: Matteo Scarlata*, Matilda Backendal, Miro Haller. (2024). "MFKDF: Multiple Factors Knocked Down Flat". USENIX Security 2024 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-scarlata.pdf
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Recommended citation: Matilda Backendal*, Hannah Davis, Felix Günther, Miro Haller*, Kenneth G. Paterson. (2024). "A Formal Treatment of End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage". Crypto 2024 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-68379-4_2
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Recommended citation: Matilda Backendal, David Balbás, and Miro Haller. (2025). "Group Key Progression: Strong Security for Shared Persistent Data". preprint
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Recommended citation: Chengsong Diao*, Danielle Dang, Sierra Lira, Angela Tsai, Miro Haller, and Nadia Heninger (2025). "No Key, No Problem: Vulnerabilities in Master Lock Smart Locks". USENIX WOOT 2025. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/woot25-diao.pdf
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This talk briefly summarizes our improvements on time measurements inside SGX enclaves. It discusses our discovery of the “Poor man’s CMOV” phenomenon, which later led to the USENIX Security paper on the Frontal Attack.
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This talks presents the results of applying cache side-channels to contemporary hardware and investigating AES lookup tables, AES key scheduling, and Argon2. The slides give a brief overview of the content described in this blog post
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This talk discusses my experience as team coach of the Swiss National Hacking Team and preparing it for the European Cyber Security Challenge 2021.
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We discuss leasons learnt from breaking MEGA for why end-to-end encrypted cloud storage is hard to design.
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In this talk, I present five attacks on the user-controlled end-to-end security MEGA. Our attacks show that a malicious provider can break authentication and compromise file confidentiality and integrity.
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There are two variants of this talk.
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We investigate the effectiveness of existing transparency mechnisms used for National Security Letters by aggregating and analyzing public information about them that is released by various sources.
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Our abstract from the talk announcement:
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This talk presents multiple attacks against the Multi-Factor Key Derivation Function, a novel cryptographic primitive that was presented at USENIX’23.
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The Blast-RADIUS attack allows an MITM attacker to authenticate to any device that uses RADIUS over UDP, which includes the vast majority of network routers and other network gear in enterprise infrastructure.
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