A Formal Treatment of End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage


Matilda Backendal¹, Hannah Davis², Felix Günther³, Miro Haller⁴, Kenny Paterson¹

¹ETH Zurich , ²Seagate Technology, ³IBM Research Zurich, ⁴UC San Diego

CRYPTO, August 21, 2024


Benefits:

+ Availability




Benefits:

- + Availability
- + Redundancy



Benefits:

- + Availability
- + Redundancy
- + Scalability




Benefits:

- + Availability
- + Redundancy
- + Scalability

Concerns:

Data leaks to third party
 => SERVER-SIDE ENCRYPTION




Benefits:

- + Availability
- + Redundancy
- + Scalability

Concerns:

- Data leaks to third party
 => SERVER-SIDE ENCRYPTION
- Malicious server
 => END-TO-END ENCRYPTION




https://www.hipaajournal.com/healthcare-cloud-usagegrows-but-protecting-phi-can-be-a-challenge/

Benefits:


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
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
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1 key distribution




- 1 key distribution
- 2 password-based security




PROBLEM: PW CHANGES!

- 1 key distribution
- 2 password-based security




PROBLEM: PW CHANGES!

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



- 1 key distribution
- 2 password-based security
- 3 file sharing







- 1 key distribution
- 2 password-based security
- 3 file sharing









Contributions


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
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
- 1 Formal Model
- Syntax
- Security games

- 2 Construction
- CSS (Cloud Storage Scheme)
- Security Proofs

1. Formalizing E2EE Cloud Storage








Security Notions WHAT SECURITY DO WE EXPECT?

Threat model:

- Malicious cloud provider
- Full control over network & operations

Game mechanics:


- Correlated passwords
- Adversary can
 - Compromise users (adaptive/selective)
 - Control users (via oracles)
 - Control server (directly)



Security Notions WHAT SECURITY DO WE EXPECT?

Integrity:

- Adversary simulates interaction
- Wins if it can, for an honest user,
 - 1. inject a file, or
 - 2. modify a file.




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
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Confidentiality:


- Additional challenge oracle
 - Submit two files f_0 , f_1
 - File f_b is uploaded
 - Guess bit *b*



- Syntax 🗸
- Security notions




• Syntax 🗸





2. Constructing E2EE Cloud Storage

Building Blocks











- Syntax 🗸
- Security notions 🗸
- Construction ✓



CONFIDENTIALITY 🗸

INTEGRITY 🗸


- Syntax 🗸
- Security notions
- Construction ✓



- Syntax 🗸
- Security notions
- Construction ✓

Still missing:


• Adaptive security proof



- Syntax 🗸
- Security notions
- Construction

Still missing:

- Adaptive security proof
- Implementation
- Feedback, model extensions, ...



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